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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________ 
 
 
                                              
* Honorable D. Michael Fisher, United States Circuit 
Judge for the Third Circuit, assumed senior status on 
February 1, 2017. 
 
** Honorable Michael J. Melloy, Senior Circuit Judge, 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting 
by designation. 
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MELLOY, Circuit Judge. 
The filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as an 
automatic stay of debt collection activities outside of 
bankruptcy proceedings.  11 U.S.C. § 362(a).  If “an 
individual [is] injured by any willful violation of [the] stay,” 
that individual “shall recover actual damages, including costs 
and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may 
recover punitive damages.”  Id. § 362(k)(1).  In the present 
case, Frank Zokaites committed several willful violations of 
the automatic stay arising from Garth and Deborah Lansaw’s 
bankruptcy petition.  Because of these violations, the 
Bankruptcy Court awarded the Lansaws emotional-distress 
damages as well as punitive damages under § 362(k)(1).  The 
District Court affirmed the awards, and Zokaites now appeals.  
We conclude that § 362(k)(1) authorizes the award of 
emotional-distress damages and that the Lansaws presented 
sufficient evidence to support such an award.  We also 
conclude that the Lansaws were properly awarded punitive 
damages.  Accordingly, we will affirm. 
I. 
A. 
 The Lansaws operated a daycare in a space leased 
from Zokaites.1  Over the course of several years, the 
relationship between the Lansaws and Zokaites devolved into 
                                              
1 Zokaites’s appellate brief incorporates the facts stated 
in the Bankruptcy Court’s memorandum opinion, Lansaw v. 
Zokaites (In re Lansaw) (“Lansaw II”), Ch. 7 Case No. 06-
23936-TPA, Adv. No. 13-2037-TPA, 2015 WL 224093 
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2015).  Our recitation of the facts 
borrows liberally from the Bankruptcy Court’s opinion. 
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various disputes.  The present dispute arose after the Lansaws 
entered into a new lease with a different landlord, but before 
they vacated Zokaites’s property.  When Zokaites learned of 
the new lease, he served the Lansaws with a Notice for 
Distraint, claiming a lien against the Lansaws’ personal 
property for unpaid rent.  The following day, August 16, 
2006, the Lansaws filed for bankruptcy,2 thereby triggering 
the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).  Zokaites’s 
attorney was notified of the bankruptcy filing by a letter dated 
August 17, 2006. 
 Zokaites, nevertheless, violated the automatic stay in 
three separate incidents.  First, on August 21, 2006, Zokaites 
and his attorney visited the Lansaws’ daycare during business 
hours to take photographs of the Lansaws’ personal property.  
Although Mrs. Lansaw initially denied Zokaites entry, 
Zokaites entered the daycare by following a daycare parent 
inside.  Zokaites then entered Mrs. Lansaw’s office and 
backed her against the wall, getting so close that she could 
feel his breath.  During the incident, Zokaites asked Mrs. 
Lansaw three times in quick succession, “Do you want to hit 
me?” 
 Second, on Sunday, August 27, 2006, Zokaites visited 
the daycare after business hours and, this time, used his key to 
enter the building.  He observed that the Lansaws had 
removed some personal property and plumbing fixtures from 
the space.  Zokaites then padlocked and chained the doors.  
Mrs. Lansaw’s mother, who had arrived to clean the daycare, 
attempted to stop Zokaites and called the police.  A police 
                                              
2 The Lansaws initially filed for bankruptcy under 
Chapter 13, but the bankruptcy was later converted to Chapter 
7. 
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officer, as well as the Lansaws, arrived at the daycare shortly 
thereafter.  Zokaites suggested that Mrs. Lansaw inform the 
daycare parents that the daycare would not be open the next 
day.  At the request of a police officer, he allowed Mrs. 
Lansaw to reenter the daycare and obtain the parents’ contact 
information.  Zokaites, however, insisted that Mrs. Lansaw be 
escorted in and out of the property by the officer. 
 After the Lansaws returned home, they received a call 
from their attorney informing them that Zokaites had left a 
proposed “interim standstill agreement” in the door of the 
daycare.  It stated that Zokaites would not unchain the 
daycare doors unless (1) Mrs. Lansaw’s mother agreed that 
she had not been assaulted by Zokaites, (2) the Lansaws 
reaffirmed their lease with Zokaites, and (3) the Lansaws 
ceased removing property from the daycare.  The Lansaws 
informed their attorney that the agreement was not 
acceptable.  They then returned to the daycare, removed the 
chains themselves, and decided to sleep in the building to 
prevent Zokaites from chaining the door again.  Later that 
night, Zokaites also returned to the daycare.  Before the 
Lansaws could reach the door, Zokaites removed Mrs. 
Lansaw’s keys that had been hanging from the inside keyhole 
and locked the door from the outside.  Zokaites left with the 
keys, which included personal keys in addition to the daycare 
keys, and returned to his vehicle.  The Lansaws called the 
police once more. 
 Finally, on August 28, 2006, Zokaites directed his 
attorney to send a letter to the Lansaws’ new landlord.  The 
letter demanded that the new landlord terminate the Lansaws’ 
new lease and stated that, if the lease was not terminated, 
Zokaites would file a complaint.  A draft of that complaint 
was included with the letter.  Zokaites’s attorney also 
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admitted having multiple phone calls with the new landlord in 
an attempt to have the new lease terminated. 
B. 
 For reasons that are unclear, the procedural history of 
the present action is somewhat complex and spans two 
separate adversary proceedings.  The Lansaws first initiated 
an adversary proceeding in August 2006 to enjoin Zokaites 
from committing further violations of the stay.  In the same 
proceeding, they also sought punitive damages, attorney fees, 
and other relief.  After a trial, the Bankruptcy Court entered a 
December 2006 order finding that Zokaites had violated the 
stay and granting the Lansaws’ request for an injunction.  
Although the Bankruptcy Court heard testimony related to 
emotional distress, it did not make a ruling on damages or 
attorney fees in its memorandum opinion.  See Lansaw v. 
Zokaites (In re Lansaw) (“Lansaw I”), 358 B.R. 666, 672, 
675 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006). 
 The Lansaws again raised the issue of damages before 
the Bankruptcy Court in February 2007.  This time, they did 
so in a counterclaim to Zokaites’s proof of claim in the main 
bankruptcy case.  This counterclaim for damages, however, 
also went unresolved.  Approximately five years later, in 
December 2012, the main bankruptcy case was reassigned to 
the Honorable Thomas P. Agresti.  After a status conference 
revealed that the counterclaim for damages was yet to be 
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settled, the Bankruptcy Court determined that the best way to 
resolve the issue was to initiate a new adversary proceeding. 3 
 The new adversary proceeding, now before us in the 
present case, was tried in August 2014.  At the outset of the 
trial, the Bankruptcy Court noted it was “building on” what 
the previous judge had already found in 2006, namely, that 
Zokaites had willfully violated the automatic stay.  Lansaw II, 
2015 WL 224093, at *3. The previous judge, however, had 
not made “definitive findings with regard to certain details of 
those violations,” so the Bankruptcy Court again heard 
testimony regarding the violations.  Id. at *13. 
The Lansaws also presented evidence of emotional 
distress, which the Bankruptcy Court summarized as follows: 
The only evidence that the [Lansaws] 
presented as to emotional stress was their own 
testimony, though that was often compelling. 
Mrs. Lansaw testified that she continues to have 
                                              
3 As Judge Agresti noted, it is unclear why the 
damages claim went unresolved for so many years.  Judge 
Agresti nonetheless determined that the damages issue 
remained open after reviewing the December 2006 opinion in 
conjunction with comments the previous judge made at a 
hearing in 2009.  When appealing Judge Agresti’s decision to 
the District Court, Zokaites argued that the omission of 
damages from the December 2006 opinion effectively denied 
the Lansaws’ request for damages and that res judicata 
therefore applied.  The District Court, however, held that the 
damages issue was not resolved prior to Judge Agresti’s 
involvement and that res judicata did not apply.  Zokaites 
does not challenge that determination in the present appeal.   
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nightmares about Zokaites entering the building 
and taking her business away. After these 
experiences she sometimes wakes up screaming 
and crying. She stated that when she is out in 
public and happens to see someone who looks 
like Zokaites she can experience moments of 
“sheer fear.” She testified that she has lost trust 
in others and this has affected her relationship 
with friends. She is taking prescription 
medication for depression and an ulcer, 
conditions which she attributes to stress from 
Zokaites, beginning with [an incident prior to 
the stay violations] and continuing thereafter. 
She felt physically threatened when Zokaites 
entered her office on August 21, 2006, and 
backed her up to a wall. Mrs. Lansaw 
acknowledged that she has not sought 
psychological counseling, but said she is 
considering doing so. 
 
Mr. Lansaw testified about the effects on 
his wife that he has observed. He said that she 
has changed markedly since the incidents 
involving Zokaites. She just goes to work and 
comes home, rarely going out in public, 
avoiding human contact, and not enjoying life. 
He testified to similar effects on himself, stating 
that he has become very withdrawn and has a 
fear of making new friendships. He testified that 
he has only one friend who understands what he 
has gone through and he has no one else to talk 
to about it. 
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Id. at *7–8 (citations omitted).  The Bankruptcy Court found 
this testimony credible and also noted that it was consistent 
with the previous judge’s 2006 decision.  The 2006 decision 
states that “Mrs. Lansaw was in tears in her various 
appearances before the Court and during her testimony.”  
Lansaw I, 358 B.R. at 672. 
The Bankruptcy Court found that Zokaites’s stay 
violations caused the Lansaws at least some emotional 
distress.  In so finding, the Bankruptcy Court considered the 
Lansaws’ credible testimony, the egregious nature of 
Zokaites’s violations, and the 2006 trial notes made and 
docketed by the previous judge.  The Bankruptcy Court, 
however, acknowledged that factors other than Zokaites’s 
stay violations also contributed to the Lansaws’ emotional 
distress.  As a result, the Bankruptcy Court “discounted” the 
actual damages award, Lansaw II, 2015 WL 224093, at *10, 
ultimately awarding the Lansaws $7,500 for their emotional 
distress and $2,600 in attorney fees.  The Bankruptcy Court 
also awarded the Lansaws $40,000 in punitive damages. 
Zokaites appealed to the District Court, which 
affirmed.  Zokaites filed this timely appeal.  
II. 
The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334; the District Court had jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a); and we have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 158(d)(1) and 1291.  “Our review of the District 
Court’s decision effectively amounts to review of the 
[B]ankruptcy [C]ourt’s opinion in the first instance.”  In re 
Allen, 768 F.3d 274, 278–79 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting In re 
Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., 298 F.3d 219, 224 (3d Cir. 
2002)).  We review the Bankruptcy Court’s factual findings 
for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.  Payne v. 
Lampe (In re Lampe), 665 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 2011).  “A 
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finding of fact is clearly erroneous only if it is ‘completely 
devoid of minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue 
of credibility or bears no rational relationship to the 
supportive evidentiary data.’” Havens v. Mobex Network 
Servs., LLC, 820 F.3d 80, 92 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Berg 
Chilling Sys., Inc. v. Hull Corp., 369 F.3d 745, 754 (3d Cir. 
2004)).  Finally, “[w]e review the constitutionality of the 
punitive damages award de novo, but we must accept any 
findings of fact . . . unless they are clearly erroneous.”  CGB 
Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health Servs., Inc., 499 
F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2007).   
III. 
Zokaites argues that the Lansaws introduced 
insufficient evidence to support an award of emotional-
distress damages under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1).  That statute 
provides, with an exception not applicable here, that “an 
individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided 
by this section shall recover actual damages, including costs 
and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may 
recover punitive damages.”  11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (emphasis 
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added).4  Accordingly, as a threshold matter, we must first 
determine whether the term “actual damages” under 
§ 362(k)(1) authorizes recovery for emotional distress.  We 
conclude that it does, as discussed below.  We then turn to 
whether the Lansaws presented sufficient evidence to support 
emotional-distress damages. 
A. 
“Because the term ‘actual damages’ has [a] 
chameleon-like quality, we cannot rely on any all-purpose 
definition but must consider the particular context in which 
the term appears.”  FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 294 (2012).  
The term has been interpreted in some contexts to include 
                                              
4 On appeal, Zokaites does not concede, but also does 
not seriously contest, that he willfully violated the automatic 
stay.  Even if we were to assume that this issue, determined in 
the 2006 decision, is properly before this Court, we would 
conclude the findings were not clearly erroneous.  Zokaites’s 
rationales for resorting to stay violations, including the advice 
of counsel, are immaterial to whether he violated the stay.  
See Landsdale Family Rests., Inc. v. Weis Food Serv. (In re 
Landsdale Family Rests., Inc.), 977 F.2d 826, 829 (3d Cir. 
1992) (“It is a willful violation of the automatic stay when a 
creditor violates the stay with knowledge that the bankruptcy 
petition has been filed.  Willfulness does not require that the 
creditor intend to violate the automatic stay provision, rather 
it requires that the acts which violate the stay be 
intentional. . . . [A] creditor’s ‘good faith’ belief that he is not 
violating the automatic stay provision is not determinative of 
willfulness . . . .” (citation omitted)).  But see 11 U.S.C. 
§ 362(k)(2) (providing a “good faith” exception to 
§ 362(k)(1) not applicable here).   
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damages for emotional distress and, in others, to only 
authorize damages for financial harm.  Id. at 292–93 
(collecting cases).  This Court has not yet had occasion to 
address whether, in the context of § 362(k)(1), the term 
“actual damages” includes emotional-distress damages. 
We do not, however, write upon a blank slate; Zokaites 
cites to numerous decisions by other courts considering the 
issue.  Three circuits have expressly concluded that, under 
§ 362(k)(1),5 emotional-distress damages are available for 
willful violations of the automatic stay.  See Lodge v. 
Kondaur Capital Corp., 750 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 
2014); Dawson v. Washington Mut. Bank, F.A. (In re 
Dawson), 390 F.3d 1139, 1148 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogation on 
other grounds recognized in Gugliuzza v. FTC (In re 
Gugliuzza), –– F.3d ––, 2017 WL 1101094, at *8–9 (9th Cir. 
Mar. 24, 2017); Fleet Mortg. Grp., Inc. v. Kaneb, 196 F.3d 
                                              
5 Section 362(k)(1) was previously codified at 
§ 362(h). Most court decisions discussed in this opinion 
therefore cite to § 362(h).  For our purposes, however, the 
statute’s language remains the same, and we discuss and 
quote the prior court decisions as if they were decided under 
§ 362(k)(1).   
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265, 269 (1st Cir. 1999).6  Two circuits have left open the 
possibility that emotional-distress damages may be available 
in some circumstances.  See Young v. Repine (In re Repine), 
536 F.3d 512, 522 (5th Cir. 2008); Aiello v. Providian Fin. 
Corp., 239 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2001).  And one district 
court has rejected the notion that emotional-distress damages 
are available as “actual damages” under the statute.  See 
United States v. Harchar, 331 B.R. 720, 732 (N.D. Ohio 
2005).  We consider three representative decisions in turn.  
1.  
 In Harchar, the Northern District of Ohio noted that 
§ 362(k)(1) “is indisputably an ambiguous statute with a 
dearth of legislative history.”  Id.  The court further noted that 
§ 362(k)(1) was not enacted with the automatic stay in 1978; 
rather, “[t]he 1978 Act provided no mechanism for 
enforcement of the automatic stay—perhaps due to 
[Congress’s] expectation that enforcement would continue via 
procedures for contempt of court.”  Id. at 729.  Indeed, prior 
to the automatic stay’s codification in 1978, contempt was 
“the accepted procedure for enforcement of stay violations.” 
Id. 
The Harchar court noted, however, that questions 
surrounded the propriety of bankruptcy judges enforcing the 
                                              
6 In Fleet Mortgage, the First Circuit upheld an award 
of emotional-distress damages and explicitly stated that such 
damages are available under the statute.  196 F.3d at 269–70 
(“[W]e note that emotional damages qualify as ‘actual 
damages’ under [§ 362(k)(1)].”). A later First Circuit decision 
nevertheless characterized Fleet Mortgage’s statement as 
dicta.  See United States v. Rivera Torres (In re Rivera 
Torres), 432 F.3d 20, 29 & n.10 (1st Cir. 2005). 
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automatic stay—now a creature of statute and not court 
order—through contempt procedures.  Id. at 730 (“[R]eliance 
on contempt power to remedy violations of § 362 had been 
widely criticized.” (quoting Pertuso v. Ford Motor Credit 
Co., 233 F.3d 417, 422 (6th Cir. 2000))).  Further, the court 
noted that the constitutional authority of bankruptcy judges to 
use contempt procedures was cast into doubt after the 
Supreme Court’s 1982 decision in Northern Pipeline 
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 
(1982).  Harchar, 331 B.R. at 730.  The court inferred that 
these circumstances informed Congress’s decision to enact 
§ 362(k)(1) because the provision was enacted as part of the 
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 
1984.7  Id.  The court therefore concluded, “[T]here can be 
little doubt that when [§ 362(k)(1)] was enacted in 1984, 
Congress was concerned not with providing debtors 
compensation for emotional harms, but with providing 
explicit statutory authorization for the ‘only previously 
available remedy for a stay violation: Contempt.’”  Id. 
(quoting In re Bivens, 324 B.R. 39, 42 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio. 
2004)).  Additionally, the court stated, “There is little 
indication that awarding damages for emotional harm was 
                                              
7 In Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court held that 
the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 unconstitutionally vested Article 
III judicial powers in “adjunct” bankruptcy courts.  458 U.S. 
at 86–87.  The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal 
Judgeship Act of 1984 was, at least in part, Congress’s 
attempt to resolve these constitutional problems.  See Pub. L. 
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). 
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commonplace under the bankruptcy court’s traditional 
contempt procedures.”  Id. 
Given this history of the contempt remedy, Congress’s 
demonstrated ability to clearly authorize emotional-distress 
damages, and Congress’s waiver of sovereign immunity 
under the statute, the Harchar court held that emotional-
distress damages were not available under § 362(k)(1).  Id. at 
732.  In so doing, the court acknowledged Congress intended, 
at least in part, that the automatic stay protect against 
psychological harm.  Id. at 731.  But, the court reasoned, 
§ 362(k)(1)’s provisions authorizing punitive damages and 
attorneys’ fees would “effectively address[ ]” Congress’s 
concerns about emotional harm and that “it was incumbent 
upon Congress” to “explicit[ly] reference . . . ‘emotional 
pain’ or ‘mental anguish’” if it intended to authorize 
emotional-distress damages as compensatory damages.  Id. at 
732.  
2. 
In Aiello, the Seventh Circuit was skeptical of a 
bankruptcy court’s ability to award emotional-distress 
damages, but it left open the possibility that such damages 
might be available under § 362(k)(1).  The court noted that 
the automatic stay is a recent codification of the more-than-a-
century-old power of courts to stay collection efforts—a 
power that originated long before “the courts [grew] more 
confident of their ability to sift and value claims of emotional 
distress.”  Aiello, 239 F.3d at 880.  According to that court, 
the automatic stay’s protection “is financial in character; it is 
not protection of peace of mind.” Id. at 879.  The court further 
reasoned, “There is no indication that Congress meant to 
change the fundamental character of bankruptcy remedies by 
enacting [§ 362(k)(1)].”  Id. at 881.  And, the court noted, 
nothing prohibits a debtor from bringing a suit under state tort 
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law for emotional injury.  See id. at 880.  The court therefore 
concluded that “[t]he office of [§ 362(k)(1)] is not to redress 
tort violations but to protect the rights conferred by the 
automatic stay.”  Id.   
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit theorized that 
considerations of judicial economy “might” permit an award 
for emotional distress under § 362(k)(1) where the plaintiff is 
already seeking damages for financial injury.  Id.  Noting that 
no such financial injury was alleged in the case before it, the 
court held that the plaintiff in Aiello was not entitled to 
emotional-distress damages for the defendant’s willful 
violation of the automatic stay.  Id.  
17 
 
  3. 
 The Ninth Circuit came to yet a different conclusion in 
Dawson.  There, the court concluded that “pecuniary loss is 
not required in order to claim emotional distress damages” 
under the statute.  Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1149 (emphasis 
added).  In coming to this conclusion, the court found it 
necessary to turn to the legislative history behind the 
automatic-stay provision.  See id. at 1146–48.  Quoting 
extensively from the House Report for the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978, the court emphasized that Congress 
enacted the automatic stay not only to provide creditors 
financial protection, but also to provide “the debtor a 
breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all collection 
efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits 
the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or 
simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove him 
into bankruptcy.”  Id. at 1147 (emphasis added) (quoting H.R. 
Rep. No. 95-595, at 340 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296–97); see also Univ. Med. Ctr. v. 
Sullivan (In re Univ. Med. Ctr.), 973 F.2d 1065, 1074 (3d Cir. 
1992) (quoting the same language).  
The Ninth Circuit further noted Congress’s concern 
with creditor collection tactics, which can “take[ ] the form of 
abusive phone calls at all hours, including at work, threats of 
court action, attacks on the debtor’s reputation, and so on.  
The automatic stay at the commencement of the case takes 
the pressure off the debtor.”  Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1147–48 
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 125–26).  Accordingly, the 
court reasoned: 
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Reading the legislative history as a whole, we 
are convinced that Congress was concerned not 
only with financial loss, but also—at least in 
part—with the emotional and psychological toll 
that a violation of a stay can exact from 
an . . . individual. Because Congress meant for 
the automatic stay to protect more than financial 
interests, it makes sense to conclude that harm 
done to those non-financial interests by a 
violation are cognizable as “actual damages.”  
We conclude, then, that the “actual damages” 
that may be recovered by an individual who is 
injured by a willful violation of the automatic 
stay include damages for emotional distress.   
 
Id. at 1148 (citation and footnote omitted). 
4. 
We find Dawson to be the better approach.  As the 
Harchar court noted, § 362(k)(1) “is indisputably an 
ambiguous statute with a dearth of legislative history.”  331 
B.R. at 732.  The best way to resolve this dilemma is not to 
make inferences from the doubts surrounding the general 
authority of bankruptcy courts in 1984, see id. at 730, but 
rather to look to the specific interests that Congress intended 
to protect when it enacted the automatic-stay provision just a 
few years earlier, see Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1146–48.  We 
conclude, like the Dawson and Harchar courts, that Congress 
intended the automatic stay to protect both financial and non-
financial interests.  And, with those interests in mind, we join 
a growing number of circuits by expressly concluding that 
“actual damages” under § 362(k)(1) include damages for 
emotional distress resulting from a willful violation of the 
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automatic stay.8  See Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1148; Lodge, 750 
F.3d at 1271; Fleet Mortg., 196 F.3d at 269.   
                                              
8 The Supreme Court’s decision in FAA v. Cooper, 566 
U.S. 284 (2012), does not compel a different result.  In 
Cooper, a divided Court concluded that the term “actual 
damages” in the Privacy Act (“the Act”) did not authorize 
recovery for emotional distress from the federal government.  
Id. at 287.  Although the Court recognized that the Act 
protected non-financial interests, id. at 294–95, the Court 
noted indications that Congress refused to authorize 
emotional-distress damages, see id. at 295–99.  The Court 
first noted that the Act’s remedial scheme “parallels” specific 
common law remedial schemes.  Id. at 295–96 (citation 
omitted).  Under those common law schemes, the term 
“general damages” would have clearly authorized recovery 
for emotional distress.  Id.  The Court then noted that a 
commission created by Congress specifically recommended 
that the Act allow for general damages, but that Congress 
never acted on this recommendation.  Id. at 297.  Thus, 
because Congress could have more clearly authorized 
recovery for emotional-distress damages and because the Act 
provided for damages against federal agencies, the Court 
invoked the sovereign immunity canon of statutory 
construction to limit damages to economic loss.  Id. at 299.  
The sovereign immunity canon requires that ambiguous 
statutory language be construed in favor of immunity.  Id. 
 
Unlike Cooper, we are unaware of any legislative 
history indicating that Congress refused to authorize 
emotional-distress damages for stay violations.  If anything, 
the legislative history is to the contrary.  See supra Parts 
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Of course, we acknowledge that the legislative history 
for the automatic stay, enacted in 1978, does not directly 
address § 362(k)(1), which was enacted in 1984.  
Nonetheless, the automatic stay’s legislative history remains 
instructive:  If the automatic stay was meant to protect against 
non-pecuniary emotional harm, it is only logical that 
Congress would intend to include damages resulting from that 
harm when it introduced the award of “actual damages” as the 
enforcement mechanism six years later.  For the same reason, 
we disagree with the Harchar and Aiello courts that there is 
no indication Congress intended to break from past 
bankruptcy practice.  By seeking to protect against non-
pecuniary emotional harm with the automatic stay and by 
enacting the “actual damages” enforcement provision soon 
thereafter, Congress sufficiently indicated a departure from 
any prior practice that may have neglected emotional harms 
resulting from stay violations.  See Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 
U.S. 505, 516 (2010) (“[W]e ‘will not read the Bankruptcy 
Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear 
indication that Congress intended such a departure.’” (quoting 
Travelers Cas. & Surety Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 
549 U.S. 443, 454 (2007))).  Further, while the Harchar court 
concluded that Congress’s concerns about non-pecuniary 
harms would be “effectively addressed” through the provision 
for punitive damages and attorneys’ fees, see 331 B.R. at 732, 
                                                                                                     
III.A.3 and 4; see also Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1147–48.  
Further, the defendant in the present case is neither the federal 
government nor a state government.  We therefore leave for 
another case the question of whether emotional-distress 
damages may be recovered under § 362(k)(1) against federal 
or state governments. 
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we see no reason to infer that Congress intended to 
distinguish between the pecuniary and non-pecuniary injuries 
when it adopted a system of compensatory damages as a 
means of enforcing stay violations. 
Finally, we need not and do not decide whether 
financial injury is a necessary predicate to recovery for 
emotional distress under the statute.  Unlike the plaintiff in 
Aiello, the Lansaws incurred financial injury in the form of 
attorneys’ fees when they sought to enjoin further violations 
of the stay by Zokaites.  See Aiello, 239 F.3d at 880; see also 
11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (“[A]n individual injured by any 
willful violation of a stay . . . shall recover actual damages, 
including costs and attorneys’ fees . . . .” (emphasis added)).9 
B. 
                                              
9 Although we do not decide whether financial injury 
is a necessary predicate, we note that § 362(k)(1) might be the 
only avenue available for a debtor to recover for emotional 
harm resulting from a stay violation.  The Aiello court implied 
that those who suffer emotional-distress damages are free to 
bring state tort claims, see 239 F.3d at 880, but multiple 
circuits have held that state law claims derived from a stay 
violation are preempted by federal bankruptcy law, see, e.g., 
E. Equip. & Serv. Corp. v. Factory Point Nat’l Bank, 236 
F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam);  Pertuso v. Ford 
Motor Credit Co., 233 F.3d 417, 425–26 (6th Cir. 2000).  
Thus, if financial injury is later determined to be a 
prerequisite to emotional-distress damages under § 362(k)(1), 
those who suffer only emotional injuries might be, contrary to 
the suggestion in Aiello, “orphans of the law.”  See 239 F.3d 
at 880.   
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 Having determined that § 362(k)(1) authorizes the 
award of emotional-distress damages, we consider what 
evidence is required to support such an award.  Zokaites 
argues that the Lansaws should have been required to provide 
medical documentation or expert medical testimony to 
support their claims of emotional distress.  According to 
Zokaites, this medical evidence was necessary to corroborate 
the Lansaws’ testimony that they experienced emotional 
distress and that this distress was in fact caused by Zokaites’s 
stay violations.  Zokaites further argues that, given the lack of 
this evidence, the Bankruptcy Court’s award was too 
speculative. 
Depending on the circumstances of each individual 
case, corroborating medical evidence may be required to 
prove emotional harm and causation.  But we decline to adopt 
a bright-line rule requiring such evidence to prove emotional-
distress damages under § 362(k)(1).  As we have concluded in 
the context of other federal statutes, “we see no reason to 
require that a specific type of evidence be introduced to 
demonstrate injury in the form of emotional distress.”  Bolden 
v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 21 F.3d 29, 36 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(considering the evidence required to prove emotional distress 
in § 1983 cases); see also Cortez v. Trans Union, LLC, 617 
F.3d 688, 720 (3d Cir. 2010) (declining, in the context of the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act, to adopt a “standard requiring ‘a 
degree of specificity which may include corroborating 
testimony or medical or psychological evidence in support of 
the damage award [for emotional distress]’” (quoting Cousin 
v. Trans Union Corp., 246 F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 2001))).  
And we agree with the Bankruptcy Court that, at least where 
a stay violation is patently egregious, a claimant’s credible 
testimony alone can be sufficient to support an award of 
emotional-distress damages.  See Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1150.  
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“We are confident that courts . . . can ensure that plaintiffs 
recover only for actual injury even in the absence of expert 
medical testimony in such cases.”  Bolden, 21 F.3d at 36.  
We conclude, moreover, that the Lansaws presented 
sufficient evidence of emotional distress to support the 
Bankruptcy Court’s award.  Testimony at trial demonstrated 
that Zokaites willfully and egregiously violated the automatic 
stay.  On one occasion, Zokaites arrived at the Lansaws’ 
business—a daycare—during business hours and, after he 
was initially denied entry, entered the daycare, backed Mrs. 
Lansaw against the wall, and asked her three times whether 
she wanted to hit him.  On another occasion, Zokaites chained 
the doors to the daycare (albeit on a weekend) and refused to 
unchain the doors unless the Lansaws reaffirmed their lease 
with Zokaites.  And, on yet another occasion, Zokaites 
attempted to have the Lansaws’ lease with their new landlord 
terminated.  
In short, Zokaites did not violate the stay with a mere 
collections call; rather, he repeatedly—at times, physically 
and in the presence of children entrusted to the Lansaws’ 
care—attempted to intimidate the Lansaws.  The Bankruptcy 
Court found the Lansaws’ testimony on these incidents 
credible and dismissed Zokaites’s testimony as “attempting to 
downplay or mitigate the seriousness of his misconduct.”  
Lansaw II, 2015 WL 224093, at *15.  We cannot, as a result, 
say that the Bankruptcy Court clearly erred in finding that 
Zokaites’s violations were so egregious “that a reasonable 
person in the position of the [Lansaws] would be expected to 
suffer some psychological harm as a result of what 
happened.”  Id. at *9. 
Neither can we say that the Bankruptcy Court clearly 
erred in finding Zokaites’s stay violations did in fact cause 
emotional harm.  Zokaites lists numerous stressors—e.g., a 
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carbon monoxide poisoning incident, legal problems with a 
child, Zokaites’s pre-automatic-stay conduct, and the inherent 
stress of bankruptcy—that may have caused the Lansaws’ 
emotional distress.  He argues that, absent extrinsic evidence 
linking the stay violations to the Lansaws’ emotional distress, 
the Bankruptcy Court could not make a determination that his 
stay violations, rather than the non-actionable stressors, 
caused the distress.  Emotional distress, however, need not be 
so thinly sliced.  Mrs. Lansaw was not required, as a matter of 
causation, to establish with absolute precision what degree 
her depression was caused by the stay violations.  As the 
Bankruptcy Court acknowledged, numerous stressors 
contributed to the Lansaws’ emotional distress and linking the 
stay violations to specific manifestations of that distress was 
likely impossible.  It is sufficient that Zokaites’s stay 
violations were so egregious that a reasonable person could 
be expected to suffer some emotional harm and that the 
Lansaws credibly testified that the violations did cause such 
harm. 
Of course, as a matter of damages, plaintiffs like the 
Lansaws will be more successful when they can link the stay 
violations to the entirety of their distress.  In the present case, 
for example, the Bankruptcy Court found it necessary to 
“discount” the emotional damages award so that the Lansaws 
were not compensated for non-actionable distress.  Lansaw II, 
2015 WL 224093, at *15.  The Bankruptcy Court looked to 
emotional-distress awards in analogous cases, see, e.g., 
Snowden v. Check Into Cash of Wash. Inc. (In re Snowden), 
769 F.3d 651, 655 (9th Cir. 2014), and awarded the Lansaws 
a comparably modest $7,500.  Zokaites argues that this 
approach was unduly speculative.  But, considering the 
circumstances of this case and the variety of stressors 
contributing to the Lansaws’ distress, we cannot say the 
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approach was clearly erroneous.  Cf. Spence v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Christina Sch. Dist., 806 F.2d 1198, 1203 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(Higginbotham, J., concurring in result) (“[T]here is ‘no legal 
yardstick by which to measure accurately reasonable 
compensation’ for injuries such as emotional distress.” 
(citation omitted)).  
In sum, plaintiffs claiming emotional-distress damages 
under § 362(k)(1) must demonstrate, as required by the 
statute, that they suffered “actual” emotional harm caused by 
the willful stay violation.  The evidence necessary to 
demonstrate such harm will likely vary from case to case.  
But, at least where the evidence also shows that the stay 
violations were patently egregious, a plaintiff’s credible 
testimony that the violations did in fact cause emotional 
distress is sufficient to support an award of damages.  Here, 
we conclude that the Lansaws presented such evidence and 
that the Bankruptcy Court did not clearly err in crediting the 
Lansaws’ testimony.  Under the circumstances of this case, an 
award of $7,500 for emotional distress was neither 
unreasonable nor unduly speculative.   
IV. 
 Zokaites next argues that the Bankruptcy Court erred 
in awarding the Lansaws punitive damages.  As previously 
noted, § 362(k)(1) allows for punitive damages “in 
appropriate circumstances.”  Although such an award must 
“comport[ ] with due process,” CGB Occupational Therapy, 
499 F.3d at 188, punitive damages are largely left to the 
discretion of the bankruptcy court, see Solfanelli v. Corestates 
Bank N.A., 203 F.3d 197, 203 (3d Cir. 2000).   
We conclude, first, that punitive damages were 
appropriate in the present case.  Zokaites correctly states that 
one of the purposes behind punitive damages is to deter future 
misconduct.  See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 
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538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003).  He further asserts that, because he 
has not improperly contacted the Lansaws in the years since 
the stay violations, “there [is] simply no evidence of future 
bad conduct to deter.”  Appellant’s Br. 49.  But, given the 
nature of Zokaites’s stay violations and his attempts to 
downplay the violations at trial, we cannot say the 
Bankruptcy Court erred in determining punitive damages 
were appropriate under the circumstances.  We reach this 
result even though the Bankruptcy Court considered evidence 
from the 2006 trial concerning Zokaites’s ability to pay 
punitive damages.  As the Bankruptcy Court noted, other 
evidence from the 2014 trial (e.g., Zokaites’s multiple 
residences) indicated he was still financially capable of 
paying punitive damages. 
Turning to the punitive damages award itself, we 
conclude $40,000 comports with due process.  In so doing, 
we “consider three guideposts: (1) the degree of 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the 
disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the 
plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the 
difference between the punitive damages awarded . . . and the 
civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.” 
CGB Occupational Therapy, 499 F.3d at 189 (quoting State 
Farm, 538 U.S. at 418).  Zokaites’s repeated stay violations, 
already discussed at length, were sufficiently reprehensible to 
support the award.  See id. at 190 (discussing the factors 
considered in determining degree of reprehensibility).  
Indeed, Judge Agresti carefully reviewed Zokaites’s conduct 
and concluded that the behavior was the “most egregious” he 
had ever encountered in his time on the bench.  Lansaw II, 
2015 WL 224093, at *20.  The 4-to-1 ratio between the 
punitive damages award and the actual damages award 
($10,100, including $7,500 for emotional distress and $2,600 
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in attorneys’ fees) is in line with awards previously deemed 
acceptable by the Supreme Court.  See State Farm, 538 U.S. 
at 425.  And, although $40,000 is higher than other awards 
examined by the Bankruptcy Court, see, e.g., In re B. Cohen 
& Sons Caterers, Inc., 108 B.R. 482, 487–88 (E.D. Pa. 1989), 
we conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the 
award is not sufficiently excessive to be unconstitutional. 
V. 
 Because we conclude § 362(k)(1) authorizes recovery 
for emotional distress, the Lansaws presented sufficient 
evidence to support such an award, and punitive damages 
were properly assessed, we will affirm.10 
                                              
10 Zokaites also argues that the damages awards are 
property of the bankruptcy estate.  After reviewing the record, 
however, we conclude that this argument has been waived.  In 
his post-trial brief before the Bankruptcy Court, Zokaites 
argued the awards should be offset against his claims in the 
main bankruptcy case, but he did not argue that the awards 
are property of the estate.  
